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The Effect of Community-Level Socio-Economic Conditions 
on Threatening Racial Encounters 
 
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on racial and ethnic tension by analyzing the 
relationship between local socio-economic conditions and the propensity for outsiders to 
have threatening racial encounters with insiders. We use unique data for a sample of active-
duty Army personnel that allow us to first, link personnel to the local communities in which 
they are located and second, to avoid any selectivity bias associated with endogenous 
community selection. We find at best mixed evidence that racial hostility is related to 
economic vulnerability within a community and no evidence that racial conflict can be linked 
to the level of public expenditure. Crime rates, however, are closely related to the incidence 
of threatening racial encounters and while a community’s demographic profile is also clearly 
linked to racial tension, these relationships cannot be easily generalized across minority 
groups or type of threatening racial encounter. 
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 1.   Introduction 
There is growing interest in understanding the forces within local communities that give 
rise to conflict between racial or ethnic groups.  Such conflicts impose large costs on 
society and may be associated with social exclusion and an inability to achieve the long-
term integration of minority groups (Dustmann et al. 2004; Gradstein and Schiff 2006).  
Recent debate has focused on the role of ethnic and racial concentration, fragmentation, 
demographic change and social distance as central factors in the development of 
prejudice and hostility towards minorities (Krueger and Pischke 1997; Green et al. 
1998b; Dustmann and Preston 2001; Dustmann et al. 2004).  Racial and ethnic tension is 
also seen to be the consequence of neighborhood heterogeneity (Sampson 1984; 
DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998) and increased ethnic fragmentation may result in reduced 
incentives for social capital investment (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Glaeser 2005) as 
well as a diminished capacity to reach consensus on social policies and the provision of 
public goods (Alesina et al. 1999, 2000, 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara 2003; Brasington 
2003; Poterba 1997).  On a global scale there are concerns that societies divided along 
ethnic and racial lines may be more likely to experience violent civil conflict (Collier 
2001; Caselli and Coleman 2006) and have slower economic growth particularly when 
social and political institutions are poor (Easterly and Levine 1997; Easterly 2001). 
Our goal is to contribute to the emerging literature on racial and ethnic tension by 
assessing the relationship between the characteristics of local communities and the 
propensity for outsiders to have threatening, racially-motivated encounters with insiders.  
Thus, our focus is on the geographic dimension of racial and ethnic intolerance. We are 
particularly interested in the following:  First, how do economic and social conditions 
  1affect the incidence of threatening racial encounters across local communities?  Second, 
how do individuals’ demographic and human capital characteristics affect the propensity 
to report incidents of racial or ethnic threats?  Finally, what can we learn about alternative 
theories of the formation of community behavior towards outsiders?   
In answering these questions, we take advantage of a unique survey of active-duty 
Army personnel—the Armed Forces Equal Opportunity Survey (AF-EOS)—which asks 
directly about racially-motivated, off-base incidents of physical intimidation, physical 
assault, and harassment by civilian police.  Information extracted from the confidential 
AF-EOS data file allows us to identify separate Army bases and hence the local 
communities in which they are located.  Consequently, we are able to analyze the extent 
to which racial hostility is related to the ethnic and racial composition, economic 
vulnerability, public spending, and crime level in the local community.  Most 
importantly, as Army personnel are assigned to (rather than select) their bases, we are 
able to avoid the selectivity bias typically associated with research on neighborhood 
effects.  In effect, the Army’s assignment of personnel is akin to ‘ignorable’ treatment 
assignment in the evaluation literature (Rubin 1978) allowing us to use standard 
regression techniques to generate unbiased estimates of the causal effect of community 
characteristics on the incidence of threatening, racially-motivated encounters.
1     
We find at best mixed evidence that racial hostility is related to economic 
vulnerability within a community and no evidence that racial conflict can be linked to the 
level of public expenditure.  Crime rates, however, are closely related to the incidence of 
                                                           
1 The Army’s personnel assignment process has also been used to assess the impact of pollution on child 
health (Lleras-Muney, 2006), the effect of parental absences on children’s educational attainment (Lyle, 
2006), the effect of work-related absences on divorce rates, spousal employment, and children’s disability 
  2threatening racial encounters and while a community’s demographic profile is also 
clearly linked to racial tension, these relationships cannot be easily generalized across 
minority groups or type of threatening racial encounter.  
In what follows we review the literature on racial and ethnic hostility within local 
communities focusing on the demographic and economic forces that are thought to give 
rise to racial tension generally.  Section 3 lays out our estimation strategy including our 
conceptual framework and reduced-form estimation equation.  Details of our data sample 
are provided in Section 4, while our results are presented in Section 5.  Finally, our 
conclusions and suggestions for future research are discussed in Section 6. 
 
2.  Understanding Racial and Ethnic Hostility within Local Communities 
A voluminous literature across the range of social science disciplines examines the role 
of race in interpersonal interactions in the United States, while the increasing 
representation of ethnic minorities in many European countries has focused attention on 
issues related to the social integration of ethnic minority groups.
2   At the heart of this 
literature is often a concern with understanding sources of inter-group conflict.  In what 
follows, we briefly review this literature with an eye towards drawing broad conclusions 
about the economic forces that give rise to racial and ethnic hostility within a community.  
How do economists think about racial and ethnic hostility?  More than thirty years 
ago, Becker (1974) argued that concepts like envy and hatred could be analyzed by 
incorporating social interactions into a standard economic model of consumer demand.  
Caring about their relative position, rational individuals might choose to harm themselves 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Angrist and Johnson, 2000), and the community-specific determinants of consumer market discrimination 
(Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2008).   
  3(i.e., give up some consumption) in exchange for the opportunity to harm others.  More 
recently, Glaeser (2005) adopts a political economy perspective arguing that hatred is 
fostered by false stories propagated by political, business, or religious leaders for their 
own benefit.
3  Finally, like other social scientists, many economists see racial and ethnic 
tension as arising out of competition over scarce resources (e.g. Frijters 1998; Caselli and 
Coleman 2006) leading some economists to argue that racial identity itself can be 
considered a type of capital asset or economic property (Darity et. al. 2006).
4    
Despite the breadth of these theoretical frameworks, the empirical economics 
literature on conflict between racial and ethnic groups within local communities has been 
largely shaped by two key questions.  In particular, how do socio-economic conditions– 
specifically the economic vulnerability of the majority group–affect the relationship 
between racial and ethnic groups?  Is the incidence of prejudice, harassment and violence 
higher in areas where ethnic and racial minorities are a larger or a smaller share of the 
total population?   
Though competition and scarce resources figure prominently in many economic 
models of group interactions, empirical studies exploring the effects of economic 
conditions on ethnic and racial tension generally find relative economic position to be a 
secondary issue.   Economic hardship–i.e., high unemployment, low wages or relative 
poverty–does not appear to be the primary factor underlying the incidence of violence 
against foreigners in Germany (Krueger and Pischke 1997), hate crimes in New York 
(Green et al. 1998a; 1998b), race riots in Los Angeles (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998), 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Specifically, Bowling (1993) reviews the emergence of racial violence as a social problem in Britain.   
3 Similarly, self-destructive warfare results from an agency problem in which politicians harm their nations 
in order to increase the probability of political success (Glaeser 2006). 
  4attitudes towards and harassment of ethnic minorities in Britain (Dustmann and Preston 
2001; Dustmann et al. 2004), or the geographic location of hate groups in the United 
States (Jefferson and Pryor 1999).
5  Moreover, after reviewing the available evidence, 
Krueger and Malečková (2003) conclude that there is little direct connection between 
having low education or living poverty and the decision to support or participate in 
terrorism.  To the extent that competition is expected to be more intense in circumstances 
in which resources are scarcer (or amongst relatively disadvantaged individuals), this 
evidence indicates that factors other than simple economic competition are important 
drivers of racial and ethnic hostility across communities.
6       
In particular, sociologists often focus on the relationship between ethnic or racial 
composition and the incidence of inter-group conflict, though perhaps not surprisingly 
alternative theories often lead to conflicting hypotheses about the nature of this 
relationship.
7  On the one hand, larger minority populations may threaten the power or 
social distance enjoyed by the majority population thus increasing the potential for 
hostility towards minority group members.  On the other hand, increased inter-group 
contact stemming from larger minority populations may diminish the power differentials 
and negative misperceptions between groups leading to less hostility (see Green et al. 
1998b; Dustmann and Preston 2001; Dustmann et al. 2004).  Which effect dominates is 
then an empirical question.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Green et al. (1998a) review the perspective on adverse economic conditions and inter-group hostility in 
the sociology and psychology literature.    
5 Dustmann et al., (2004) find that local unemployment rates are positively associated with harassment in 
single-equation models, though this effect disappears in multi-equation models that take into account 
correlation in unobserved characteristics. 
6 In fact, Jefferson and Pryor (1999) argue that historical accident may be more important than economic or 
sociological explanations of the geographic location of hate groups in the United States. 
7 See Green et al. (1998b) who provide a particularly helpful categorization of sociological theories relating 
the size of minority populations to the incidence of racial conflict.   
  5  Dustmann and Preston (2001) review the empirical evidence on the relationship 
between the representation of and negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities within 
local communities.  Their review documents the complete failure of the empirical 
literature to achieve consensus on this issue–even when considering similar attitudes in 
the same country.  A more limited literature suggests that acts of hostility–i.e., racial 
harassment or racially-motivated crime – are negatively related to the size of the minority 
group (Krueger and Pischke 1997; Green et al. 1998b; Dustmann et al. 2004).  Finally, 
racially-motivated crime in local neighborhoods also seems to be related to demographic 
change (Green et al. 1998a; 1998b).   
  This divergence in empirical results–while frustrating for those interested in the 
design of public policy–is perhaps not surprising in light of the complexities of the 
underlying economic and social processes that give rise to inter-group conflict.  At the 
same time, it is possible to take from this diverse literature two important lessons 
regarding the nature of racial and ethnic conflict in local communities.  First, simple 
models of economic competition are insufficient to fully capture the nature of racial 
hostility.   Second, it is important to estimate models that are flexible enough to consider 
not only the size of various racial and ethnic groups, but also more complex dimensions 
of racial/ethnic diversity such as the extent of racial fragmentation and polarization 
within local communities.     
 
3. Estimation Strategy: 
Our conceptual framework is based on economic models of victimization in 
which the propensity to experience crime depends upon the actions of victims and 
  6perpetrators who interact within a specific social context (see Markowitz, 2004).  Both 
precautionary and risky behaviors affect the chances of becoming a victim, while the 
social context determines the costs and benefits of criminal activity more generally.   
Because data are usually only available on perpetrators once a crime is committed, most 
researchers estimate reduced-form models of victimization that include the characteristics 
of potential victims, aggregate measures of the propensity of others to commit crimes, 
and dimensions of the social context.
8   
We adopt a similar logic and use the following reduced-form model to assess a 











      ( 1 )  
where i and j indexes individuals and communities, respectively. While   accounts for 
the socio-economic factors underlying community-level racial intolerance, 
j Z
ij X controls 
for those individual characteristics thought to capture the nature of a soldier’s interaction 
with the community as well as his or her perceptions of racial threats.  Finally, ij ε is an 
error term comprised of unobserved individual heterogeneity ( i η ) and a random error 
term ( ij ν ).    
Identifying the exogenous effects of local communities from the effects of 
unobserved individual characteristics that are correlated with location choice can be 
                                                           
8 Dustmann et al. (2004) rely on this approach in estimating the effect of a neighborhood’s ethnic 
concentration on hostility towards ethnic minorities in the UK. 
  7difficult.
9  Since individuals typically choose where they live, the characteristics of the 
local community ( ) will be correlated with both the observable ( ) and unobservable 
characteristics (
j Z ij X
i η ) of individuals.  This selection process implies that  0 ) | ( ≠ j ij Z E ε  




10   
Previous researchers have relied on instrumental variable techniques, fixed-effects 
estimation, natural experiments or randomized social trials to deal with this identification 
problem (Ludwig et al. 2001; Katz et al. 2001; Sacerdote 2001; Kling et al. 2005; Foster 
2006).  Here we exploit the fact that Army personnel are assigned to (rather than choose) 
their military installations.  Though the Army’s assignment procedure is not literally 
random in the sense that personnel are assigned to bases using a lottery, location 
assignments are made solely on the basis of an individual’s skills or training and the 
Army’s particular needs—not on the basis of race or ethnicity (Lleras-Muney 2006; Lyle 
2006).
11  This assignment procedure in conjunction with our ability to control for 
individuals’ skills implies that any unobserved characteristics related to the likelihood of 
reporting threatening racial encounters will be uncorrelated with community 
characteristics.  In effect, any unobserved heterogeneity in individuals’ propensity to 
report racial hostility is balanced across communities ensuring that we have unbiased 
estimates of the effects of community characteristics (see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).   
It is not possible to provide direct evidence on the nondiscriminatory nature of the 
Army’s procedures for troop assignment.  We investigate this issue empirically, however, 
                                                           
9 In effect, this model fits into the class of models designed to estimate the effects of neighborhood 
characteristics on individual behavior.  See Manski (1993) for a discussion of the identification issues. 
10 See Plotnik and Hoffman (1996), Dietz (2002), and Haurin et al. (2002). 
  8by analyzing the relationship between the observed characteristics of Army personnel and 
the characteristics of the community to which they are assigned.  Specifically, there is a 
21.0 percentage point disparity in the average reported incidence of threatening racial 
encounters between communities in the top and bottom quintile of the distribution.   
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions indicate that at most between 3.2 and 24.9 percent of the 
gap in the incidence of threatening racial encounters is explained by variation in soldiers’ 
characteristics across communities (see Table 1).
12   The vast majority of the gap in racial 
hostility stems from differences across communities in the likelihood that personnel with 
similar characteristics report threatening racial encounters.  Community-level variation in 
the incidence of racial hostility does not, therefore, appear to be driven by the non-
random assignment of Army personnel with particular characteristics to those 
communities.  Moreover, Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2008) provide additional evidence 
using the same data sample that the Army’s assignment procedure does not lead to racial 
differences in the chances of being assigned to a community in which ones own racial 
group is overrepresented and that—controlling for rank and skills—Army personnel of 
different races are equally likely to be assigned to communities with different 
characteristics. 
Table 1 Here 
These institutional arrangements and this empirical evidence gives us confidence 
that it is reasonable to assume that any unobserved individual characteristics affecting the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 For a discussion of military assignment procedures see http://usmilitary.about.com. 
12 We implement the decomposition as follows.  We construct an indicator variable that equals 1 whenever 
a respondent reports experiencing a racially-motivated incident of physical intimidation, physical assault, 
or civilian police harassment in the local community.  We then estimate a linear probability model of the 
determinants of threatening racial encounters separately for communities in the top and bottom quintile and 
calculate a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The controls in the model include:  race, gender, 
  9propensity to report racial threats will be uncorrelated with the characteristics of local 
communities. The propensity of experiencing a threatening racial encounter is 
unobserved so we create an indicator variable reflecting the presence or absence of 
reported threatening racial encounters.  Specifically, 
Pr( 1) Pr( ) ( ) ij j ij ij TZ X Q φ βη γ == + > = Φ      (2) 
 
where  (, ) j ij QZ X = ,  (, ) γ φβ = ,  ij j ij η με = + ,  Φ is the standard normal cumulative 
density function.  Finally, we assume that  ~( 0 , 1 ) ij N η  and that (| )0 ij EQ η = .  Thus, φ
)
 
provides an estimate of the causal effect of community characteristics on the incidence of 
threatening racial encounters related to race or ethnicity. 
   
4.  The Armed Forced Equal Opportunity Survey 
We use a sample of Army personnel drawn from the public-use 1996 U.S. Armed Forces 
Equal Opportunity Survey (AF-EOS).  We focus solely on Army personnel, excluding 
personnel from other branches of the military, as the previous literature documents that 
Army personnel’s assignments to duty location are closely linked to the needs of the 
Army and can be treated as exogenous for our purposes (see Lleras-Muney 2006; Lyle 
2006; Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2008).  The data generalize to Army personnel with at 
least six months of active-duty service who are below the rank of general.  Minority 
groups were oversampled to ensure adequate numbers of minorities were available for 
analysis.  Questionnaires were mailed to sample members between September of 1996 
                                                                                                                                                                             
family situation (marital status and the presence of children), education, rank, and the racial composition of 
an individual’s military occupation.   
  10and January of 1997 and the overall response rate was 52.7 percent (see Elig et al. 1997; 
Wheeless et al. 1997 for more details).   
The AF-EOS data provide us with information on reports of threatening racial 
encounters, demographic and human capital characteristics, as well as a variable 
extracted from the confidential file that allows us to identify separate Army installations.  
The ability to identify unique Army installations is extremely important for our purposes 
as it allows us to match Army bases to their surrounding communities.   
We restrict our analysis to personnel serving in the United States with non-
missing installation codes so as to match individuals to their local communities.
13  
Moreover, we only consider installations for which we have a sample of at least 10 
active-duty members.  Finally, we exclude Native-Americans due to small sample size.  
These restrictions produce a final sample of 6208 Army personnel across 67 separate 
installations with non-missing values for the key variables.
14   
 
4.1 The Incidence of Threatening Racial Encounters Across Communities 
Army personnel captured in the AF-EOS were asked whether – as a result of their race or 
ethnicity – they had in the previous 12 months:  1) been harassed by local civilian 
police
15; 2) been physically threatened or intimidated; or 3) been physically assaulted.  
We use these data to create three separate indicator variables which equal one whenever 
one of the above is reported and zero otherwise.  We also create an indicator variable 
equal to one if any of the above is reported and zero otherwise.  Means and standard 
                                                           
13 We exclude members serving overseas as approximately 40 percent of overseas personnel have missing 
installation codes.  Approximately 13 percent of members of the Army serving in the United States have 
missing installation codes.   
  11deviations for our indicator of threatening racial encounters and its three underlying 
components are presented separately by race in Table 2. 
Table 2 HERE 
These results indicate that more than one in ten individuals on active-duty in the 
U.S. Army report experiencing some form of racial threat within their local community in 
the previous 12 months.  While the overall incidence of threatening racial encounters is 
much the same among white, Hispanic, and Asian personnel, black soldiers are 
substantially more likely (14.4 percent) to report experiencing racial threats.   
Moreover, there are important differences in the incidence of different types of 
threatening racial encounters.  For all racial/ethnic groups, with the exception of blacks, 
physical threats and intimidation are the most common form of threatening racial 
encounters reported (that is, 10.6, 6.0, and 7.8 percent for white, Hispanic, and Asian 
personnel, respectively).  Black personnel, on the other hand, are more likely to report 
having been harassed by local civilian police (10.3 percent) than to report having been 
physically threatened or intimidated (8.1 percent).  The incidence of physical assault is 
less common and roughly the same (3 percent) for all racial/ethnic groups.     
 
4.2  Characterizing  Economic and Social Conditions within Local Communities 
Threatening racial encounters are assumed to be driven in part by socio-economic 
conditions within the local community.  We begin by defining the ‘local community’ 
surrounding each of the 67 bases identified in our estimation sample to be the set of 
individual towns, cities, or localities situated within a 10-mile radius of the specific 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 The sample size varies depending on the measure of threatening racial encounters used—6191 (local 
civilian police harassment), 5279 (physically threatened/intimidated), and 5275 (physically assaulted). 
  12base.
16  Community-level characteristics (drawn from Census data)
17 are matched to each 
individual city, town or locality within this 10-mile radius and then aggregated up to the 
‘local community’ level weighting by population size.
18  Finally, local community-level 
characteristics are then assigned to each individual based on his or her installation.  This 
process links soldiers to the social context within a particular community.
19   
We capture racial and ethnic diversity within a community using data on the share 
of the local population in various race groups (i.e. white, black, Asian, and other) in each 
community.
20  This allows us to assess whether threatening racial encounters are related 
to a community’s racial and ethnic profile generally.  At the same time, researchers have 
also argued that inter-group relations can be better understood in the context of racial 
fragmentation (e.g. Alesina et al. 1999, 2000; Alesina and La Ferra 2000; Easterly and 
Levine 1997; Easterly 2001), racial dominance (e.g. Collier 2001), or racial polarization 
(e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara 2004).  Consequently, we present and discuss estimation 
results comparing all of these measures of racial and ethnic diversity in Section 5.1.3.
21   
We are also interested in analyzing the relationship between economic 
vulnerability and threatening racial encounters.  Many social science theories link 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 This question also pertains to whether a member of one’s family was harassed by local civilian police. 
16 We determined if a community is within 10 miles of an installation using “ePodunk”, which is a search 
engine that allows one to map the distance between locations. For more information see 
http://www.epodunk.com. 
17 Community level characteristics were matched to the communities drawn from ePodunk using Geolytics 
CensusCD and Maps 1990. 
18 Crime (violent and property) and community-level spending on police protection and highways are 
aggregated to the county level as the underlying data are not available at a more disaggregated level. 
19 Alternative results based on a 5-mile radius and county-level definitions of “community” are 
substantively the same.  These results are not presented here but are available upon request. 
20 While Census data do separately identify Hispanics, they are not a mutually exclusive racial group.  
Alesina et al. (1999) argue, however, that ‘other’ is a good measure of the Hispanic population as those in 
the other category are predominantly Hispanic.  While Native Americans are excluded from estimation 
sample, they are of course included in the demographic profile of the community.  Specifically, Native 
Americans are included in the ‘white’ category.       
21 Summary statistics for community- and individual-level variables are given in Appendix Table 1. 
  13hostility and violence between groups to adverse economic conditions (see Green et al 
1998a; Frijters 1998; Caselli and Coleman 2006).  However, after carefully reviewing the 
empirical literature, Krueger and Malečková (2003) conclude that hate crimes appear to 
be independent of adverse economic conditions.  We re-examine this issue in the context 
of military communities by incorporating three alternative measures of economic 
vulnerability (the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, and income inequality) into our 
analysis of threatening racial encounters.
22       
We also control for the incidence of crime and the level of public expenditure 
within the local community in order to account for the ways in which the social context 
may influence the degree of racial hostility.  Specifically, our model includes separate 
measures of both the violent crime and property crime rates.
23  This division by type of 
crime is sensible given that violent crimes are more likely to be motivated by the intent to 
harm the victim, while property crime is more likely to be motivated by material gain 
(Becker 1974).  This division is also consistent with evidence that, although low wages or 
a lack of education is associated with a higher probability of committing a property 
crime, the incidence of violent crime appears to be unrelated to economic opportunities 
(see Krueger and Malečková 2003 for a review).   Moreover, others have argued that 
there is a link between racial and ethnic conflict, on the one hand, and a community’s 
willingness and/or ability to invest in social capital and public goods provision on the 
other (Poterba 1997; Alesina et al. 1999, 2000, 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, 2003; 
Brasington 2003; Glaeser 2005). To account for this, we also include measures of the 
                                                           
22 Income inequality is measured as the log of the ratio of per capita income for the racial group with the 
highest income and the income of the racial group with the lowest income in a local community.  In this 
case, we separately identify the ‘white’ category from the ‘Native American’ category. 
  14natural log of per capita community-level spending on police protection and highways in 
the model.
24  While the former is likely to be directly relevant for understanding racial 
crime and police harassment, the latter acts as a control for social infrastructure more 
broadly.
25  
   Finally, our estimation model also includes an extensive list of individual-level 
characteristics that previous research suggests may be related to the propensity to report 
racial tension generally.  Specifically, we include measures of demographic 
characteristics (indicator variables for being female, currently married, or in an interracial 
marriage as well as the presence of children), education levels (indicator variable for a 
college degree), and job characteristics (indicator variables for years of service, officer 
status, and the racial distribution of ones military occupation).   
 
5. Threatening Racial Encounters within Local Communities  
Estimation results (probit marginal effects and standard errors) based on equation 2 
(henceforth referred to as Model 1) for our three measures of threatening racial 
encounters (physical threats, physical assault, and police harassment) are presented in 
Tables 3 through 5.
26 Specifically, while the estimates for community-level and 
individual-level determinants are estimated together, for convenience we present and 
discuss each separately.  Table 3 provides estimates of the effects of economic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 Crime (violent and property) is calculated as (number of crimes/county population)*100,000.  Therefore, 
it measures – at the county level – crimes per 100,000 of the population.   
24Spending on public goods—both police protection and highways—is calculated as ln(general 
expenditures for public goods/county population). 
25 We also include, but do not report, controls for community size, whether the community is located in a 
southern or Pacific state, and the number of localities within each community.      
26 Marginal effects are evaluated at the means.  Standard errors are calculated using the delta method and in 
all cases account for the clustering on communities. 
  15vulnerability and social context, while results for racial/ethnic diversity and individual 
characteristics are presented in Tables 4 (top panel) and 5, respectively.   
 
5.1 The Effect of Community Characteristics on Threatening Racial Encounters  
5.1.1 Economic Vulnerability 
Consistent with the previous literature, we find, at best, mixed support for the notion that 
racial hostility is related to economic vulnerability.  On the one hand, there is a sizable 
effect of local unemployment rates on the probability that soldiers report having been 
physically threatened or intimidated in the local community surrounding their military 
installation.  The effect of a marginal change in the civilian unemployment rate on the 
propensity for Army personnel to report being physically threatened or intimidated 
because of their race is 0.795 (see Table 3).  In elasticity terms this implies that a one 
percent increase in the level of civilian unemployment leads to a 0.77 percent increase in 
the likelihood that a soldier reports being threatened or intimidated.
27  Together our 
measures of economic vulnerability are jointly significant in explaining both physical 
threats/intimidation and physical assaults.  At the same time, we find no evidence that 
reported police harassment can be linked to the underlying economic vulnerability of a 
local community.  Moreover, although economic vulnerability is jointly significant in 
explaining physical assaults, none of our three measures is individually significant and 
both income inequality and the poverty level are estimated to have the wrong sign.   We 
are left then with large and positive effect of local unemployment rates on the extent to 
which individuals feel physically threatened or intimidated because of their race.   This 
  16may reflect either a higher degree of racial tension or a heightened sensitivity to racial 
issues generally. 
Table 3 Here 
5.1.2 Social Context 
Despite arguments in the literature that racial conflict influences the extent to which 
communities can invest in social capital and provide public goods, we find no evidence 
that the reverse is true.  The level of public expenditure on policing or highway 
infrastructure is unrelated to the degree of racial tension within local communities.   
Crime rates, however, are closely linked to the incidence of threatening racial encounters.   
Reported police harassment is positively related to the level of violent crime within a 
community, and is negatively related to the level of property crime.   A one percent 
increase in violent crime leads to a 0.26 percent increase in police harassment, while a 
one percent increase in property crime results in a reduction in reported police 
harassment of 0.37 percent everything else constant.  These results suggest that civilian 
police may be more aggressive in interacting with Army personnel in those communities 
in which violent crime is more prevalent.  At the same time, reports of racially-based 
physical threats/intimidation and physical assaults are higher in communities in which the 
level of property crime is also higher.   The diversity of results across type of crime 
(violent vs. property) lends support to the previous literature that argues the motivation 
for these two types of crime differs (Becker 1974; Krueger and Malečková 2003), while 
the diversity of results across type of threatening racial encounters (police harassment vs. 
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  17physical threat/intimidation or physical assault) suggests that the economic and social 
conditions driving these encounters are quite different.  
 
5.1.3 Racial and Ethnic Diversity 
We begin by measuring racial and ethnic diversity as the proportion of the local 
population in different racial groups. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that the racial and 
ethnic profile of a community using this measure is linked to the reported incidence of 
threatening racial encounters between Army personnel and members of the local 
community (see Table 4, Model 1).  Reports of physical threats/intimidation, physical 
assaults, and police harassment are all significantly more likely in those communities in 
which a higher proportion of the local population is Asian or Pacific Islander.  Reported 
civilian police harassment is also higher in communities with a larger Hispanic 
population.  A standard F test indicates that our race and ethnicity measures are jointly 
significant at the 5 percent level in all three cases.  Moreover, the magnitude of these 
effects is substantial.  Specifically, a one percent increase in the Asian/Pacific Islander 
population results in a 0.22 percent increase in the likelihood that a soldier reports being 
threatened or intimidated.   A similar increase in the proportion of individuals reporting 
their race as “other” (i.e. predominantly Hispanics) results in a 0.12 percent increase in 
reports of police harassment.  At the same time, threatening racial encounters between 
Army personnel and the civilian population are unrelated to the proportion of the local 
population that is black, while physical threats/intimidation and physical assaults are 
lower in communities with a larger Hispanic population—though these effects are 
imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant at standard levels.  Thus, while a 
  18community’s demographic profile is clearly linked to racial tension, these relationships 
cannot be easily generalized across minority groups or type of threatening racial 
encounter.  
Table 4 Here 
  We turn now to consider whether accounting for the number and relative size of 
racial groups or the distribution of the population across insider-outsider and majority-
minority lines can provide additional insight into the ways in which racial and ethnic 
diversity are related to community-level conflict with outsiders.    We consider five 
alternative measures of racial and ethnic diversity. 
  First, we consider two measures which differentiate the population into those who 
are first, “minority” vs. “majority” and, second, “insiders” vs. “outsiders”.  In particular, 
our first measure of racial and ethnic diversity is the proportion of the local population 
that is in a minority group (i.e. black, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander), while the 
second measure controls for the proportion of the population in the local community that 
is outside ones own racial or ethnic group.  These two measures in some sense reflect 
extreme positions on the nature of inter-minority group relations.   In the first case, 
individuals’ reports of threatening racial encounters are assumed to depend only on the 
proportion of the population that is non-white.  The distribution of the local population 
across different minority groups is not taken into account.  In the second case, 
individuals’ likelihood of reporting racial conflict depends only on the proportion of the 
local population that is outside his or her own racial group.   These two measures make 
different assumptions about the way in which community-level racial and ethnic diversity 
affect the likelihood that minority individuals report racial tension.  While the first 
  19assumes that a change in the size of a competing minority group has the same effect as a 
change in the size of ones own minority group, the second assumes that a change in the 
size of a competing minority group has the same effect as a change in the size of the 
majority (white) group.  For white personnel, the two measures are the same. 
  Finally, we calculate a variety of measures that have been used in the literature to 
account for racial and ethnic diversity.  Our third measure differentiates communities on 
the extent that they are fragmented, i.e. composed of many different racial and ethnic 
groups.  Racial fragmentation ( ) is given by:  j R
∑ − =
k
kj j s R
2 1  
where   is the proportion of the population in community j that is in group k .  In effect, 
 measures the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from the local 
population belong to different groups (see Alesina et al. 1999, 2000; Alesina and La Ferra 
2000; Easterly and Levine 1997; Easterly 2001).  Higher values of the index indicate 
more fragmentation.  At the same time, Collier (2001) argues that the United States is 
generally characterized by racial dominance rather than racial fragmentation and 
moreover, that this distinction has important implications for the effect of ethnic diversity 
on economic performance.  Consequently, we create a fourth measure of racial diversity 
which accounts for racial dominance within a local community and takes the value of 1 
whenever   > 0.85 for some group k in local community j.  In our data, this measure 
defines communities in which whites are roughly 90 percent of the population.  Finally, 
our fifth measure accounts for the extent of polarization within a community.  Alesina 




  20may be more unstable than one which is more racially fragmented because the two 
groups will often be in direct conflict with one another.  This is conceptualized by an 

















− =  
The index reaches a maximum when there are two groups of equal size.
28
  We re-estimated equation (2) substituting these five alternative measures of racial 
and ethnic diversity for the set of population proportions.  The resulting marginal effects 
(and standard errors) are reported in Table 4, Models 2 through 6.   
  Our results indicate that the reported incidence of racial conflict is higher in 
communities with a larger minority population.  Specifically, a one percent increase in 
the size of the minority population is associated with a 0.53 percent increase in police 
harassment, a 0.95 percent increase in physical threats/intimidation, and a 0.48 percent 
increase in physical assaults.  The propensity of reporting threatening racial encounters 
also increases as the relative size of the population of outsiders grows.   The effects of a 
one percent increase in the proportion of the local population that is in a racial or ethnic 
group different to ones own on racial conflict are of a similar magnitude ranging from 
0.45 percent (physical assaults) to 0.97 percent (physical threats and intimidation).     
These results for a wide cross-section of U.S. communities are at odds with other 
evidence on racial harassment and racially motivated crime in Germany, the U.K, and 
                                                           
28 There are two additional concepts that are occasionally used to characterize the extent of racial and 
ethnic diversity within a population.  Green et al. (1998a,b) argue that it is the change in the representation 
of racial groups rather than overall population proportions which is important in understanding racially-
motivated crime.  Moreover, Caselli and Coleman (2002) discuss the importance of ethnic distance, i.e. the 
cost of assimilating into the dominant group, in understanding ethnic conflict.  Unfortunately, our Census 
data do not provide us with sensible measures of either of these concepts. 
  21New York (Krueger and Pischke 1997; Green et al 1998b; Dustmann et al 2004), 
suggesting that results based on particular institutional settings or on specific 
communities  may not be easily generalizable. 
    Although racial fragmentation and racial polarization have been linked to a 
variety of important economic outcomes including participation in social activities, 
spending on public goods, public employment, economic performance, inter-racial crime, 
and the risk of civil conflict (Sampson 1984;  Alesina et al. 1999, 2000; Alesina and La 
Ferra 2000; 2004; Easterly and Levine 1997; Easterly 2001), we find no evidence that the 
extent of fragmentation or polarization within a local community is related to the 
incidence of threatening racial encounters.  Racially-motivated physical assaults are 7.1 
percentage points more likely in those communities in which one racial group (generally 
whites) represents more than 85 percent of the total population, however, this effect 
disappears when population dominance is based on an 80 percent threshold.  This 
suggests that any effect of racial dominance on reported physical assaults is concentrated 
in local communities with a high degree of racial segregation.
29   In contrast, Collier 
(2001) presents cross-national evidence that the effects of racial dominance in reducing 
economic growth and increasing civil wars occurs at much lower levels of segregation.
30     
           
5.2 The Effect of Individuals’ Characteristics on Threatening Racial Encounters 
Our conceptual framework implies that reports of threatening racial encounters will 
depend in part on the way that military personnel interact with their local communities 
                                                           
29 These results are not presented here, but are available upon request.  Seven communities fall under the 85 
percent threshold while thirteen fall under the 80 percent threshold.  Under both definitions, dominant 
communities are predominantly white. 
  22and the extent to which they are inclined to attribute any unpleasant interactions to the 
effects of race or ethnicity.  Neither of these can be observed directly in our data.   
Nevertheless, we have accounted for a range of demographic, human capital, and job 
characteristics which, arguably, are related to both the nature of a soldier’s community 
interaction and his or her sensitivity to racial and ethnic issues. 
  Our results indicate that black, Hispanic, and Asian personnel are all significantly 
more likely than white personnel to report having been harassed by local civilian police 
because of their race or ethnicity.   In particular, black soldiers are more than six times as 
likely to report police harassment as are their white counterparts, while Hispanic and 
Asian soldiers are more than twice as likely.  It is unclear whether this indicates that 
minority personnel are more frequently in conflict with local civilian police or whether it 
reflects a greater tendency on the part of minority personnel to attribute conflict to the 
effects of race or ethnicity.  Interestingly, however, race and ethnicity are generally 
unrelated to reports of racially-based, physical threats/intimidation and physical assault.  
The only exception is that relative to white soldiers, Hispanic soldiers are significantly 
less likely to report physical threats or intimidation.  Thus, if a heightened sensitivity to 
race or ethnicity (rather than a greater propensity for experiencing conflict) underlies the 
higher incidence of reported police harassment among minorities, this does not appear to 
extend to other types of unpleasant encounters within the local community. 
Table 5 Here 
  We find limited evidence that a soldier’s family situation is related to the 
probability that he or she will report experiencing racial conflict within the local 
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 Specifically, Collier (2001) finds that racial dominance in the range of 45 to 60 percent has a small 
negative effect on economic growth, while dominance in the range of 45 to 85 percent has a large positive 
  23community.   Specifically, the presence of children does not impact a soldier’s incidence 
of reporting any form of threatening racial encounters.  The same is true for being 
married to someone of a different race or ethnicity with the following exception, we find 
that Army personnel who are married to someone of a different race or ethnicity are 
substantially more likely than other individuals to report that they (or their spouse) were 
harassed by the local civilian police.  We do find, however, that married soldiers are 
significantly less likely than their single counterparts to report having been physically 
threatened/intimidated (45 percent less) or physically assaulted (56 percent less) because 
of their race or ethnicity.  Of course, marital status is not easily observable making it 
unlikely that the perpetrators of racial threats specifically target single individuals.  It is 
more probable that these results reflect an increased tendency for single individuals to put 
themselves in situations in which conflict is likely to occur.   
Finally, there is some evidence that the incidence of threatening racial encounters 
is lower amongst women and those with higher human capital endowments.  Specifically, 
female soldiers report only half of the racially-based physical assaults and less than half 
of the racially-based physical threats/intimidation of their male colleagues.  The 
incidence of physical threats and intimidation is also dramatically lower (45 percent) 
among those soldiers with at least a college degree, while officers report substantially 
fewer physical assaults and less police harassment.  Similarly, reports of police 
harassment are also less frequent among Army personnel with at least six years of active-
duty service.  Taken together, these results indicate that experiences of racial conflict 
vary dramatically across population groups.    
   
                                                                                                                                                                             
effect on civil wars.     
  246. Conclusions  
This paper sheds light on the geographic dimension of racial and ethnic tension by 
analyzing the link between social and economic conditions within local communities and 
the propensity for outsiders to have a range of threatening, racially-motivated encounters 
with insiders.  A unique survey of active-duty Army personnel allows us to link 
respondents to the local communities in which they are located.  Consequently, we are 
able to analyze the extent to which reports of racially-motivated police harassment, 
physical threats/intimidation and physical assault are related to the ethnic and racial 
composition, economic vulnerability, public spending, and crime level in the local 
community.  We avoid the selectivity bias typically associated with research on 
neighborhood effects by exploiting the exogenous nature of the Army’s process for troop 
assignment to generate unbiased estimates of the causal effect of community 
characteristics on the incidence of threatening racial encounters. 
We find that while the racial and ethnic profile of a community can be linked to 
the incidence of racial conflict between Army personnel and members of the local 
community, these relationships are not easily generalized across minority groups or type 
of threatening racial encounter.  In aggregate, the reported incidence of threatening racial 
encounters is higher in communities with a larger minority population or as the 
population outside ones own racial group grows, though there are instances in which 
conflict declines as the relative size of some minority populations grow.  We also find 
that the incidence of police harassment is positively (negatively) related to the level of 
violent (property) crime within a community, while reports of racially-based physical 
threats/intimidation and physical assaults are more common in communities high 
  25property crime rates.    We find at best mixed evidence that racial hostility is related to 
economic vulnerability within a community and no evidence that racial conflict can be 
linked the level of public expenditure.  Finally, at an individual level, we find that 
variation in the propensity to report threatening racial encounters is related to differences 
in ones race and ethnicity as well as ones family situation. 
These findings lead to a number of important conclusions.  First, threatening 
racial encounters between insiders and outsiders appear to be driven largely by a 
community’s demographic profile and crime level.  Despite the crucial role of economic 
competition in many social science theories of inter-group conflict (Frijters 1998; Green 
1998a; Caselli and Coleman 2006), our results for military communities in the U.S. are 
consistent with what Krueger and Malečková (2003) conclude and is the emerging 
consensus in the empirical literature, i.e. that hate crimes can be viewed as independent 
of economic deprivation.  Given this, there is a need to continue to make progress on the 
formulation of alternative theories which can be useful in understanding the stylized 
facts.   If economic deprivation is not the source of inter-group conflict then what is? 
Second, the diversity of results across types of encounters—police harassment on 
the one hand versus physical threat/intimidation and physical assault on the other—
suggests that the economic and social conditions driving these encounters are quite 
different.  While perhaps intuitively obvious, nonetheless, this disparity clearly suggests 
that one size does not fit all.  It is highly unlikely that one conceptual framework or 
theoretical model will provide an adequate representation of all forms of inter-group 
conflict across all types of communities.  It is important that we begin to understand the 
  26ways in which alternative forms of inter-group hostility differ and the extent to which our 
understanding of one situation can be applied to another.                  
   Finally, our results suggest that variation in the incidence of racial conflict does 
not stem solely from unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to attribute conflict to 
the effects of race or ethnicity.  And, moreover, that there is potential for individuals to 
alter the risk of experiencing racial conflict by taking precautionary actions (or 
alternatively engaging in risky behavior).
31  At the same time, given the lack of direct 
measures of these issues in the AF-EOS data, our results are necessarily  inferential.   
Consequently, there is a need to develop better data sources that can shed light on the 
way in which individuals’ experiences of racial and ethnic conflict depend on their own 






                                                           
31 See Dustmann et al. (2004) on this point. 
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  31Table 1. Oaxaca Decomposition Results
Low Weights High Weights
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Total Differential in Reports of Threatening Racial Encounters
a 0.2102*** 0.0219 0.2102*** 0.0219
Attributable to Differences in Characteristics 0.0001 0.0021 0.0524*** 0.0213
Percent due to Differences in Characteristics 0.0319 24.9095
Attributable to Differences in Coefficients 0.2101*** 0.0220 0.1578*** 0.0252
Percent due to Differences in Coefficients 99.9681 75.0905
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
a This is the difference
in the incidence of threatening racial encounters in the 20 percent of communities with the highest level of threats
and the 20 percent of communities with the lowest level of threats.Table 2. Threatening Racial Encounters and its Components by Race
Overall White Black Hispanic Asian
Threatening Racial Encounters 0.114 0.105 0.144 0.095 0.092
(0.318) (0.306) (0.351) (0.293) (0.289)
[6208] [1404] [2040] [1689] [1075]
    Local Civilian Police Harassment 0.042 0.015 0.103 0.040 0.045
(0.200) (0.120) (0.304) (0.197) (0.207)
[6191] [1400] [2030] [1688] [1073]
    Physically Threatened/Intimidated  0.094 0.106 0.081 0.060 0.078
(0.293) (0.308) (0.272) (0.238) (0.268)
[5279] [1261] [1650] [1427] [941]
    Physically Assaulted 0.030 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.031
(0.172) (0.167) (0.176) (0.190) (0.173)
[5275] [1263] [1645] [1427] [940]
Notes: Sampling weights used.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  Sample size in brackets.  Threatening racial encounters
is coded as 1 if respondent reported experiencing at least one of the respective behaviors, and 0 otherwise.  Local civilian 
police harassement is coded as 1 if responcent reported yes and my race/ethnicity was a factor, and 0 otherwise.  Physically 
threatened/intimidated and physically assaulted are coded as 1 if respondent reported either once or twice, sometimes or 
often, and 0 otherwise.  Table 3. Determinants of Threatening Racial Encounters: Economic Vulnerability and Social Context
(Probit Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
   Local Civilian Police Harassment    Physically Threatened/Intimidated     Physically Assaulted
Model 1
Economic Vulnerability
    Income Inequality -0.008 -0.026 -0.018
(0.012) (0.047) (0.016)
    Poverty Rate -0.035 0.047 -0.082
(0.068) (0.179) (0.059)
    Civilian Unemployment Rate 0.071 0.795*** 0.081
(0.080) (0.292) (0.082)
    P-Value of Joint Test 0.647 0.012 0.012
Social Context
    Crime
        Violent Crimes^,^^ 0.018** -0.024 -0.011
          per 100,000 Population (0.007) (0.025) (0.008)
        Property Crimes^,^^ -0.003* 0.014*** 0.004***
          per 100,000 Population (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
    P-Value of Joint Test 0.030 0.015 0.009
    Public Goods
        Ln(General Expenditures for Police Protection/ 0.002 -0.019 -0.009
          County Population)^ (0.007) (0.020) (0.006)
        Ln(General Expenditures for Highways/County 0.003 -0.000 0.003
          Population)^ (0.003) (0.014) (0.005)
    P-Value of Joint Test 0.631 0.519 0.309
Observations 6191 5279 5275
Notes: All specifications also include controls for social context (i.e., South, Pacific, Ln(Total Population/1000), and Number of Communities) and the 
individual characteristics listed in Table 4. ^ Measured at the county level.  ^^All crime variables are included in the probit as crime/1000. Sampling weights 
used.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by community. ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Table 4. Determinants of Threatening Racial Encounters:  Measures of Racial/Ethnic Diversity
(Probit Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
r
Local Civilian Police Harassment Physically Threatened/Intimidated Physically Assaulted
Model 1
    Percent Black 0.018 -0.006 -0.005
(0.023) (0.098) (0.032)
    Percent Asian/Pacific Islande 0.082*** 0.281*** 0.042***
(0.012) (0.047) (0.016)
    Percent Other 0.145*** -0.336 -0.120
(0.052) (0.251) (0.092)
    P-Value of Joint Test 0.000 0.000 0.013
Model 2
    Percent Minority 0.064*** 0.258*** 0.042***
(0.015) (0.051) (0.016)
Model 3
    Percent Not You 0.045** 0.176*** 0.026**
(0.020) (0.054) (0.012)
Model 4
    Fragmentation 0.036 0.099 -0.029
(0.027) (0.120) (0.031)
Model 5
    Polarization 0.019 0.108 -0.007
(0.019) (0.079) (0.019)
Model 6
    Dominance (>85%) 0.004 0.041 0.071**
(0.010) (0.038) (0.035)
Observations 6191 5279 5275
Notes: All models also include controls for the community level characteristics and the individual level characteristics listed in Tables 3 and  5, respectively. 
Sampling weights used.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by community. ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Table 5. Determinants of Threatening Racial Encounters: Individual Level Characteristics
(Probit Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
    Local Civilian Police Harassment     Physically Threatened/Intimidated      Physically Assaulted
Model 1
Race
    Black 0.095*** -0.003 0.006
(0.013) (0.020) (0.006)
    Hispanic 0.031** -0.036*** 0.004
(0.013) (0.011) (0.007)
    Asian 0.038* -0.014 0.003
(0.021) (0.016) (0.008)
    P-Value of Joint Test 0.000 0.019 0.682
Family Situation
    Married -0.006 -0.043* -0.017***
(0.005) (0.024) (0.007)
    Mixed Marriage 0.024* 0.012 0.009
(0.014) (0.017) (0.009)
    Presence of Kids -0.007 -0.009 0.004
(0.007) (0.017) (0.005)
Education
    College -0.006 -0.043** 0.003
(0.008) (0.022) (0.010)
Female -0.005 -0.059*** -0.015***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.002)
Years of Active Service
    6 or less 0.017*** 0.023 0.008
(0.006) (0.014) (0.005)
Officer -0.015*** 0.004 -0.022***
(0.004) (0.036) (0.005)
Observations 6191 5279 5275
Notes: Based on the results presented in Tables 3 and 4, Model 1. Sampling weights used.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by 
community.  Model 1 also included controls for the racial distribution of ones military occupation. ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 




    Percent White 0.654 0.161
    Percent Black 0.240 0.147
    Percent Asian/Pacific Islander 0.073 0.164
    Percent Other 0.033 0.041
    Percent Hispanic 0.087 0.131
    Percent Not You 0.521 0.275
    Percent Minority 0.346 0.161
    Racial Fragmentation 0.433 0.104
    Polarization 0.751 0.176
    Dominance (>85%) 0.082 0.275
Economic Vulnerability
    Income Inequality 0.665 0.169
    Poverty Rate 0.146 0.044
    Civilian Unemployment Rate 0.092 0.030
Crime^
    Violent Crimes per 100,000 Population 607.291 433.806
    Property Crimes per 100,000 Population 5149.707 2469.232
Public Goods^
    General Expenditures for Police Protection ('000s) 3.945 0.601
    General Expenditures for Highways ('000s) 3.728 0.771
Social Context
    South 0.691 0.462
    Pacific 0.151 0.358
    Ln(Total Population/1000) 3.976 1.126
    Number of Communities 8.169 11.850
Individual-Level Characteristics
Race
    Black 0.269 0.443
    Hispanic 0.099 0.299
    Asian 0.025 0.157
Family Situtation
    Married 0.681 0.466
    Mixed Marriage 0.121 0.326
    Presence of Kids 0.521 0.500
Education
    College 0.218 0.413
Female 0.148 0.355
Years of Active Service
   6 or less 0.459 0.498
Officer 0.189 0.391
% Minority in DoD Occupation Group (Enlisted-E; Officer-O)
   8.4-24.3 (E); 0-12.1 (O) 0.181 0.385
   24.5-28.6 (E);12.3-13.8(O) 0.052 0.222
   29.1-34.4 (E);14.1-14.8(O) 0.352 0.478
   35.8-42.2 (E);14.9-17.7(O) 0.168 0.374
   42.7-46.4 (E);17.8-20.3(O) 0.094 0.292
   47.2-54.3 (E);20.8-37.4(O) 0.153 0.360
Number of Observations 6,224
Notes: Sampling weights used.  ^ Measured at the county level.